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ABSTRACT
Prompted by our commentators, we take this response as an opportunity to clarify the 
premises, attitudes, and methods of our enactive approach to human languaging. We high-
light the need to recognize that any investigation, particularly one into language, is always 
a concretely situated and self-grounding activity; our attitude as researchers is one of know-
ing as engagement with our subject matter. Our task, formulating the missing categories 
that can bridge embodied cognitive science with language research, requires avoiding pre-
mature abstractions and clarifying the multiple circularities at play. Our chosen method is 
dialectical, which has prompted several interesting observations that we respond to, partic-
ularly with respect to what this method means for enactive epistemology and ontology. We 
also clarify the important question of how best to conceive of the variety of social skills we 
progressively identify with our method and are at play in human languaging. Are these skills 
socially constituted or just socially learned? The difference, again, leads to a clarification 
that acts, skills, actors, and interactions are to be conceived as co-emerging categories. We 
illustrate some of these points with a discussion of an example of aspects of the model at 
play in a study of gift giving in China.
Keywords: Enactive epistemology, Enactive ontology, Dialectics, languaging, Shared know-how.
RESUMO
Impulsionados por nossos comentadores, consideramos esta resposta uma oportunidade 
para esclarecer as premissas, atitudes e métodos de nossa abordagem enativa da lingua-
gem humana [human languaging]. Ressaltamos a necessidade de reconhecer que qualquer 
investigação, particularmente sobre a linguagem, é sempre uma atividade concretamente 
situada e auto-fundamentada; nossa atitude como pesquisadores é do saber como engaja-
mento com nosso tópico. Nossa tarefa, formular as categorias ausentes que podem unir a 
ciência cognitiva incorporada à pesquisa sobre linguagem, requer evitar abstrações prema-
turas e esclarecer as múltiplas circularidades em jogo. Nosso método escolhido é dialético, 
o que suscitou várias observações interessantes às quais respondemos, particularmente 
com respeito ao que esse método significa para a epistemologia e ontologia enativas. Tam-
bém esclarecemos a importante questão de como melhor conceber as várias habilidades 
sociais que progressivamente identificamos com nosso método e que estão em jogo na 
linguagem humana [human languaging]. Essas habilidades são socialmente constituídas ou 
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We are very grateful to Eros Carvalho, Nara Figueire-
do, and Sofia Stein for their thoughtful comments, queries, 
and criticisms of our book Linguistic Bodies. They indicate 
issues that need clarification, expansion, and sometimes fur-
ther thinking. We welcome this opportunity to shed light on 
points that have remained undeveloped, or need to be under-
lined in their meaning and importance, in what is a complex 
project whose goals cannot be entirely achieved in a single 
book. Our investigation is and should remain an ongoing task.
This is a good chance, then, to offer an elucidation of 
the core commitments of our enact ive approach and the par-
ticular methodology with which we broach the question of 
human languaging. Although the commentaries touch on 
various issues, underlying them there seems to be a concern 
about both our starting point and our method of investiga-
tion. So we will start there, and address as we proceed sp ecific 
questions and criticisms.
Our first clarification concerns the attitude we take 
as researchers within the enact ive approach and has to do 
with acknowledging the situatedness of our inquiry and of 
our community of knowers. Knowing—as researchers—is 
simultaneously a task of engagement with our subject mat-
ter and a task of self and other transformation. By this we 
mean that it is crucial to adopt epistemic attitudes that will 
not abstract our object of knowledge violently, making it fit 
within pre-given categories and methodologies we have at 
hand and with which we feel comfortable. Human knowing 
advances through the dialectics of letting-be (De Jaegher, 
2019), in this case, of letting “language” be, as the diffuse and 
complex set of phenomena that it is. We contend that the 
task of providing a properly embodied persp ective on what 
people do when they do languaging requires filling in an im-
portant gap in concepts and categories, a task for which our 
best guides are the phenomena themselves. We explicitly re-
ject a method of positing abstract concepts as generalizations 
of regional empirical information, because we do not want to 
inherit the assumptions that are inevitably contained in that 
information, i.e., the conditions of validity that put limits to 
any empirical observation. Our theory aims at capturing the 
totality, not just a region, of language (a goal that, we insist, 
remains open-ended, because language is itself open-ended). 
The methodology of compartmentalization, analysis, and in-
tegration can yield good results in sp ecific cases, but not in 
this one, we argue, because the study of any part of language, 
be it phonetics, pragmatics, grammar, language change, etc. 
requires framing assumptions about other parts of language 
in order to move forward. These are typically assumptions 
about the low dependence of the target domain on those oth-
er areas (e.g., phonetics abstract ed from pragmatics, grammar 
abstract ed from conversation, and so on). Generalizing from 
these local assumptions toward language as a whole, experi-
ence tells us, is risky. The situation is confounded when we 
consider the relation between language and “extra-linguistic” 
cognitive, emotional, social, and biological processes. As we 
defend in the book, there isn’t much that pertains to human 
life that is untouched by language: “Language is like a mesh 
that fract ally penetrates the lifeworld without ever covering it 
entirely, without fully determining it, and yet, given any phe-
nomen[on] of interest, language is always to be found infini-
tesimally close to it” (Di Paolo et al., 2018, p. 136).
It is for these reasons that we adopt certain assumptions 
about the world, certain core theoretical notions that come 
from previous work in the enact ive approach. To this we add 
a method that we deem necessary for our task, which is to let 
language sp eak to us and, in our engagement with it, fill in the 
missing categories that embodied cognitive science has yet to 
produce.
But what are these assumptions, what are these prior 
concepts, and what is our method? To provide a comprehen-
sive answer to these questions would exceed the scope of this 
response, but we may sp ecify a few asp ects of our enact ive on-
tology and epistemology that are relevant to the issues raised 
by our commentators. 
A concern common to the three commentaries is the 
operation of a potentially invalid circularity in our method-
ology. For example, Carvalho (2021) wonders how respon-
siveness to others can be a kind of shared know-how ‘all the 
way down’. He is willing to grant that shared know-how may 
beget more shared know-how, but is compelled by Martens 
and Schlicht (2018) to posit an initial sensitivity to others 
that is “basic” to individuals. We return to a detailed discus-
sion of this issue below. Figueiredo (2021) worries that the 
relationship between ontology and epistemology in enact ive 
theory is too close, closing out an independent world that 
ontology should capture without the collusive shadow of re-
lational epistemology lurking in the background. Figueiredo 
herself suggests “Maybe, the best way to conceive this par-
adox is, in an admittedly circular manner … we could con-
sider the world as constantly changing and our relations to 
the world as constantly changing as well,” but decides “I will 
not explore this idea here.” These are important questions to 
address because, indeed, enact ive methodology departs sig-
nificantly from standard assumptions and idealizations about 
how science and knowledge production work. As mentioned 
apenas aprendidas socialmente? A diferença, novamente, leva a um esclarecimento de que atos, habilidades, atores e 
interações devem ser concebidos como categorias co-emergentes. Ilustramos alguns desses pontos com uma discussão 
de um exemplo de aspectos do modelo em jogo em um estudo sobre a entrega de presentes na China. 
Palavras-chave: Epistemologia enativa, Ontologia enativa, Dialética, Linguagem, Saber-como compartilhado.
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above, enact ive ontology and epistemology alike begin with 
the co-arising nature of knower and known, or subject and 
world. And one might worry, as Stein (2021) does, that there 
is a risk of losing touch with other parts of science in following 
this path. There is an essential “groundlessness” built into this 
approach to mind (see, e.g., the discussion of Varela, Thomp-
son and Rosch, 1991 in Haskell, Linds and Ippolito, 2002) 
and, now, language. 
Yet while it is rare-ish to engage Eastern philosophy in 
philosophy and sciences of mind, appreciating the inevitable 
situatedness of knowledge projects is not novel for the West-
ern tradition, only marginalized. Human science critiques of 
psychology date back at least to Dilthey in the 1860s (1957), 
who “argued that if scientists’ experience was human, then 
their method must entail understanding” (Walsh, Teo and 
Baydala, 2014, p. 557). Feminist critiques have made clear 
how science is not and cannot be value-free; embracing re-
lationality, persp ectivism (also expressed in Nietzsche), and 
defeasibility (another way of thinking interact ional mean-
ing-making) is the authentic path for science (see e.g. Hard-
ing, 1986; Keller, 1983). De Jaegher continues this work 
of engaged epistemology by also learning from indigenous 
epistemologies and neurodivergent conversation partners 
(2019; forthcoming).
By these lights, any scientific endeavor grounds itself; 
ideally, this is a self-conscious self-grounding, but not always 
so. Self-grounding sometimes takes the shape of a disavowed 
reification of categories, as if our working scientific concepts 
are just given and not the result of a history of epistemic work. 
But notice that, certainly on an enact ive view, a self in isola-
tion is a fiction. Researchers are in dialogue with traditions, 
with colleagues, with their own experiences. How then do we, 
as the three particular researchers we are, approach our work? 
We aim to stay true to who we are together. This re-
quires perpetual negotiations: while we share certain training 
and theoretical common ground, we have different sp ecial-
izations, and each needs to balance different professional and 
personal pressures. Additionally, each of us has a distinct style 
of working, co-working, and languaging. Space for these dif-
ferences is maintained (not only geographically, though there 
is also that!) in a care-ful exercise that builds on years of its 
own making. We have co-evolved a shared way of thinking 
— an evolving knowing-how — that we can recognize and 
pract ice when we are not act ively collaborating (for exam-
ple, sp eaking singly about our shared projects, coming across 
a book or article and seeing it as  something that would in-
terest the other, noting observations that would fit our next 
collaboration). These distributed pract ices partly guide our 
returns to working together. When co-writing, we are in-pro-
cess together. Our collaborations are conversation-driven, 
whether in video calls, Google doc comments, or gathered 
around Hanne’s dining room table. Co-authoring has been a 
long-standing example in the participatory sense-making lit-
erature, and for good reason: writing with another, as a partic-
ular form of languaging, consists in letting each other in and 
working-in-tension with interact ion dynamics that emerge 
and dissipate. We can say in our case that, again building on 
a history that importantly includes breakdowns and recov-
eries, the writing is carried out now with great trust for the 
others’ ability to express the view we are holding and build-
ing together, and each maintains openness to having one’s 
own words revised or overwritten. Openness and letting-be 
is also pract iced in regards to the free-ranging reading that 
informs our work beyond traditional disciplinary boundaries. 
We offer these remarks on our pract ices as a demonstration 
of how self-grounding can work. It occurs in researching to-
gether, in working out different meanings, ideas, and interests, 
and eventually, the production of an intervention—a paper, 
a book, a talk, a project— in the wider dialogue of a research 
community, where an analogous process is constantly taking 
place.
Beyond this general debate about the possibility of pure 
objectivity in science, it is common to fret that researchers 
working on language and cognition are caught in an unbreak-
able cipher, since we are doing the very thing we are trying 
to study. This is an impossible critique; it has the feel of the 
argument from consciousness, a counter-argument to the 
possibility of machine thinking that Turing considered in 
his 1950 paper “Computing machinery and intelligence”. Of 
this argument Turing writes, “According to the most extreme 
form of this view the only way by which one could be sure 
that a machine thinks is to be the machine and to feel oneself 
thinking. One could then describe these feelings to the world, 
but of course no one would be justified in taking any notice” 
(Turing, 1950, p. 446). Skepticism should actually have less 
tract ion when the target is our own behavior; who better 
to know this than ourselves? To be less glib, however, there 
is no reason not to hold to the standards of engaged episte-
mology set out above (our attitude of letting be), regardless 
of the degree of reflexivity involved. Humans are reflexive 
and self-conscious beings; this is precisely why all knowledge 
pursuits must be persp ectivized (and, in principle, something 
that our investigation also aims to explain). Clear-eyed circu-
larity understood as non-detached knowing is not a danger 
but in fact the most honest research method we can pract ice. 
We acknowledge that circularity can still be susp ect in 
traditional scientific circles, even these days. But it is far from 
being a rarity, esp ecially since the study of complex nonlinear 
dynamical systems started to gain ground in physics, biology, 
and psychology around the 1980s and 1990s. Mutual modu-
lation between systems in coupling, interact ions across scales, 
structural and developmental transitions triggered by small 
parametric changes, self-organization, synergies, regimes of 
criticality, and so on — these ideas give the lie to the assump-
tion that the only valid scientific attitude is a reductionist one. 
The enact ive approach, since its origins, has thrived in such 
ideas and has simultaneously avoided the traps of abstract 
reductionism and mysticism. It does so with models, exper-
iments, computer simulations, mathematical techniques, etc., 
and operational thinking.
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A constraint in our methodology that the commenta-
tors have not remarked on and, in view of Stein’s worries, we 
may have not stressed sufficiently, is that any concept build-
ing we do must always be grounded operationally, using other 
concepts that are themselves grounded operationally. Thus, 
when we sp eak of autonomy, this is grounded in the systemic 
idea of operational closure (Di Paolo and Thompson, 2014), 
when we sp eak of adaptivity and sense-making, these are de-
fined in non-teleological terms and take the concept of au-
tonomy as a starting point (Di Paolo, 2005). When we sp eak 
about participatory sense-making, we combine in a definition 
of social interact ion two different systemic requirements, the 
autonomy of the participants and the autonomy of the inter-
act ive pattern (De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007). Sensorimotor 
schemes are defined in terms of sensorimotor contingencies, 
which are themselves grounded in dynamical systems de-
scription (Di Paolo et al., 2017). And so on. Any technical 
idea that has been proposed, not just in this book but in pre-
vious work within the enact ive approach, can be cashed out in 
operational terms. We thus avoid mystical constructions and 
confusions, as in the case of representationalism where we are 
obliged to disregard ubiquitous homuncular or mereological 
fallacies due to a lack of operationality. This is our constraint: 
admit circularity as a virtuous possibility in concept building, 
but ground technical concepts operationally. Linguistic Bodies
is no exception.
What our book brings to the surface is a dialectical 
methodology that has always been lurking in enact ive re-
search, particularly in the work of Francisco Varela (1976, 
1979). As we explain in the book, this is not to replace ex-
isting dynamical systems ideas, but to potentiate them by 
placing them within a method that has arguably generated 
many insights in the study of historically changing complex 
totalities. We can expand here what this move means for the 
enact ive approach, but we don’t think it is as neatly divided, 
as Figueiredo suggests, into ontological, epistemological, and 
methodological boxes. These asp ects, for various reasons, 
tend to merge into one another, as she also acknowledges.
To repeat, we adopt an enact ive (not a dialectical) on-
tology and epistemology, and in this work also an explicitly 
dialectical method. That these can work together does in-
deed say something about our enact ive ontology and epis-
temology (and their complex relation), but it does not say 
straightforwardly that these are simply dialectical; or at least, 
this would be a rushed conclusion if we do not clarify fur-
ther what this could mean in our case. Moreover, in the true 
spirit of open-ended inquiries, and following a central lesson 
from enact ion that states that we are always transformed by 
our pract ices, adopting dialectics as a method, can and indeed 
does transform our approach. 
What are these transformations? Does the enact ive 
epistemology change? In a way, it does. We see more clearly 
that knowing as engagement is indeed a never-ending passage 
from the abstract to the concrete, and in that sense dialecti-
cal. We approach our subject as situated knowers with ideas, 
prejudgments, expectations and these are transformed by the 
concrete and newly situated engagement if we let our object 
of knowledge be. As knowers, we must also accommodate 
these changes in relation to our past history, or sedimented 
knowledge in the face of this ongoing knowing. This accom-
modation is also clarified dialectically. And so we can indeed 
say that an enact ive epistemology does incorporate a dialec-
tical attitude, but perhaps does not reduce to what others in 
the past have understood as a strictly dialectical epistemology. 
The difference may be revealed in some comments by 
Stein, who worries about whether other tools, such as anal-
ysis, grounding in the physical sciences, and so on, are not at 
risk of being discarded as a whole in our approach (tools that, 
however, are extensively used in the model itself, as each ex-
pansion demands analysis of tendencies and contradictions, 
and each transition demands empirical input). To be clear, 
our use of dialectics should not be seen as opposed to anal-
ysis or empirical work but as a way of organizing the use of 
analytical tools and empirical knowledge. If we had adopted a 
crude and dogmatic version of dialectics that sp ecifies a set of 
rules and patterns of thinking without attention to historical 
and material constraints, Stein’s worry might be warranted. 
The phrase, “a dialectical epistemology”, without clarification, 
might invoke such an idea, which is why we insist the best 
way to think about our investigation is that it follows an en-
act ive epistemology, simply because this highlights asp ects of 
engagement and personal experience we do not tend to find 
in strictly, and particularly dogmatic, approaches in dialectics. 
It is for this reason that our dialectical approach is modelled 
on thinkers who stressed the lived and living charact er of di-
alectics in human praxis, thinkers like Evald Ilyenkov, Karel 
Kosík, Tran Duc Thao, Mikhail Bakhtin, and even Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty and Jean Piaget. From the persp ective of an 
enact ive epistemology, our use of dialectics is an enriching act 
of self-discovery and self-transformation.
And what about ontology? Figueiredo thinks this is 
where our contact with dialectics is perhaps the weakest. We 
insist that we would not state, as she suggests, that we are in-
deed adopting a dialectical ontology. We adopt an enact ive 
one. But like epistemology, might not our ontological atti-
tudes be transformed by this deployment of dialectics? As a 
matter of fact, they are, but again, not in the sense that we 
may claim that our ontology is simply dialectical.
Dialectics feeds back into ontology because the oper-
ational grounding of technical concepts becomes clarified 
and sometimes even re-signified by becoming more con-
crete. This is the case of how we move from autopoiesis (a 
set-theoretical notion) to the enact ive conception of life as 
autonomous agency (a concept embedded in more concrete 
temporality and material constraints). This dialectical move 
is concretized by analysing the opposed tendencies of the two 
conditions of autopoiesis: self-production and self-distinction 
(Di Paolo et al., 2018, p. 39–41). Our intervention reveals 
something that was occluded (but not disallowed) in the 
classical concept of autopoiesis, the fact that life is at its core 
Letting language be: refl ections on enactive method 
121Filosofi a Unisinos – Unisinos Journal of Philosophy – 22(1):117-124, jan/apr 2021 
always underwritten by a primordial tension. This tension is 
material and temporal: How to distinguish oneself from the 
environment (and thus enact a minimal kind of freedom) 
while at the same time remaining dependent on it? The appli-
cation of dialectical thinking to one of the core ideas in the en-
act ive approach gives explicit voice to something about which 
autopoiesis theory had remained silent: life entails both on-
going tensions and contradictions as well as a measure of 
freedom, or as Hans Jonas summarized it: a needful freedom. 
Enact ive ontology is thus elaborated, clarified, expanded. 
Figueiredo seems to worry that this kind of transforma-
tion blurs philosophical distinctions. She finds no major issues 
with dialectics as a method (in the model) or as an epistemol-
ogy (moving from the abstract to the concrete), but questions 
whether it is possible to defend a dialectical ontology (some-
thing we do not exactly claim to be doing), since ontologi-
cal claims might turn out to be the result of epistemological 
and methodological moves. It is true that there are subter-
ranean connections between ontology and epistemology in 
our approach. As she quotes, ontology cannot be reduced to 
epistemology but cannot be divorced from it either. As we 
stated earlier, the enact ive approach is self-reflective, mean-
ing that ontological claims are themselves made by situated 
sense-makers, whose act ivities are embodied, dialogical, and 
historical. Figueiredo is correct in suggesting that ontology is 
therefore epistemologically conditioned. Yet when she pro-
poses that our situatedness seals us off from any ontological 
claim simply because such claims would always be the result 
of situated cognizing, she risks turning the project into a new 
kind of idealism. But, based on the premises above, we can 
indeed make ontological claims: for instance, the claim that 
all processes, including our bodies, are relations of occur-
rences, potentialities, energies, flows, as well as barriers and 
constraints that constitute tensions and dialectical situations 
that may or may not lead to individuation and new dialectical 
configurations. Idealism is precisely what we are striving to 
avoid with claims of this kind, esp ecially the idealism of naive 
materialism and other epistemologically-proofed ontologies 
of a world-out-there unchanged by our act ivity. We see again, 
in Figueiredo and Stein, a bit of that anxiety that self-ground-
ing endeavours can provoke. 
At this point we can return to the questions Carvalho 
raises regarding our account of shared know-how, which is 
admittedly undertheorized — perhaps appropriately so. It 
should follow from the foregoing that we try to keep alive and 
kicking as much nuance as we can when thinking about what 
goes on in languaging encounters. We cannot be satisfied with 
a neat or final distribution of roles and responsibilities in par-
ticipatory sense-making; bodily interact ions are messier than 
that. Of course at the same time we should not leave read-
ers guessing, and we can upon this invited reflection clarify 
that “shared” in “shared know-how” means at least two things: 
1) overlapping repertoires, and 2) equal ownership or use or 
co-enactments of know-hows. These two meanings do not 
exhaust the way the idea of know-hows plays a role in our 
account of linguistic bodies, because there can still be par-
tial acts that are co-enact ed but distinct (“unshared”), which 
form a successful social act. Furthermore, there is know-how 
in dividing our labour to the benefit of everyone, and this idea 
of interlocking or complementary skills and repertoires is also 
operational in our model, but does not entail overlapping 
skills nor enact ing together a same set of schemes. 
Entertaining reductionist possibilities, Carvalho seems 
to see only two alternatives: shared know-how belongs to sin-
gle agents, or it belongs to a joint social system (and this makes 
him worry about whether such a system can be an agent, giv-
en that the notion of know-how is agent-related). This move 
misses the fundamental insight of participatory sense-mak-
ing, thereby raising a sp ecter of ontological concerns about 
agency. When Carvalho says “the participatory sense-making 
act ivity has allegedly some autonomy in relation to the indi-
vidual sense-making of the participants,” and it seems to him 
“reasonable to assume that the system the participants bring 
forth together enacts a world of significance for itself ”, he 
seems to presuppose a mapping of participatory sense-making 
onto the interact ion process, and of sense-making onto the in-
dividual agents who participate in the interact ion. But partic-
ipatory sense-making does not simply map onto the interac-
tion process, nor does sense-making map onto the individual. 
This is the whole point of giving an affirmative answer to the 
question: Can social interact ion constitute social cognition? 
(De Jaegher et al., 2010). What participatory sense-making is, 
is the way individuals make sense, together, while interact ing 
and while self-organizing, i.e., in the fields of tension between 
and spanning those processes. Participatory sense-making—
and sense-making both—are act ivities (and experiences) that 
have these processes (individual and interact ive self-organiza-
tion) as their basis, but transcend them too. 
In thinking about shared know-how as participatory 
sense-making we can follow the main argument in Sensorim-
otor Life: “act ivity and agency are co-constituted (Di Paolo et 
al., 2017). Acts can exist that no agent intends and yet be per-
formed and possibly appropriated by agents. In turn, such acts 
help constitute agency and in some cases, this agency is not the 
agency of the participants, nor the agency of a supra-system 
(the dyad, the family), but something ambiguous and in-be-
tween, that might develop in more than one direction. But this 
development is not necessitated to grant these acts their status 
as such.4 It may be that individual participants become social 
agents in concrete configurations by contributing (together 
with others) to the enactment of social acts. In this they use 
know-how they acquire from participatory experience, and 
what is “shared” is the normative co-reference between the var-
ious individual know-hows (I do this bit, you do that bit, in co-
4 This may be another case of an uncomfortable circularity. But, as we have done on other occasions, we notice that it is not a new one. 
Similar views of acts can be found in philosophers such as Suzanne Langer (1967) and Christine Korsgaard (2009).
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ordination, and we negotiate potential normative dissonances 
in our encounter, as we can see in the example of gift giving 
below). The knowing-how is distributed across the individual 
participants, and social acts can be enact ed, and yet this does 
not necessitate positing a full-blown supra-agency. For enac-
tion, agency does not logically precede act ing, but co-emerges 
with it (in participatory sense-making as in the case of senso-
rimotor agency). So there is no logical problem about sp eaking 
of act ions enact ed socially, across individual bodies, that do not 
have a single, unified, enduring agency behind them.
It may be acceptable in some cases to change the term 
‘shared know-how’ to ‘joint know-how’, and this may help 
resolve some worries. However, there is something that we 
want to emphasize by the term ‘shared’ and that is that joint 
knowing-how becomes the know-how of a group of partici-
pants in the double sense that it is sedimented as a habitual 
pract ice, and that in many cases, roles can be exchangeable. 
This serves to consider at a later stage how these pract ices, 
powers, and sensitivities can spread or enter into dissonance 
with the pract ices of other groups of interactors. Joint know-
how, as a concept, doesn’t by itself facilitate this conceptual 
development (one may sp ecialize in only just one set of partial 
acts and never others; something that indeed can happen, but 
without some exchangeability and sedimentation, one would 
not be able to proceed to other stages in the model). 
Consider, as an example of the fluidity of knowing each 
other and knowing what to do in interact ions, gesture re-
searcher Simon Harrison’s microanalysis of two friends nego-
tiating a gift exchange (Harrison, forthcoming). The friends 
are two young Chinese women; one is visiting the other in 
her home to give her money as a wedding engagement gift. 
Following local custom, such a gift is to be refused, at least ini-
tially.5 We could say that both parties share in the knowledge 
both that it is appropriate to offer a monetary gift in celebra-
tion of a coming wedding and that it is appropriate for the 
would-be receiver to refuse (but ultimately accept) the gift (a 
norm also demonstrated in the highly embodied “see-saw bat-
tles” Harrison discusses that take place over gifts given for the 
Lunar New Year in China). Yet such sedimented cultural in-
telligence does not necessarily imply an embodied knowledge 
or habitual skill regarding how this manifest tension will be 
resolved by these women in this episode. Yes, each knows how 
to be a guest, receive guests in the home, have a conversation, 
give and receive a gift, even have an argument, surely as deep 
habitual know-how. Resolving the tension at hand could draw 
on these incorporations of previous experience, but how they 
handle it here and now cannot be predicted nor analyzed into 
discrete skills that could then be assigned to the participants 
or added together in a summative way. Such knowing-how is 
a path laid down in walking, or in this case, wrestling, as the 
friends struggle bodily to reach a resolution. 
Harrison’s micro-analysis of this multimodal mean-
ing-making event deploys our dialectical model’s logic to show 
how the participants generate and manage interact ional ten-
sions together, in a cyclical and spontaneous fashion, through 
bodily sense-making including “postures, facial expressions, 
gestures, and direct body-to-body manipulations” (Harrison, 
forthcoming). Stages of the dialectical model allow Harrison 
to structure a rapid, dynamic event brimming with affect and 
movement as the two friends play out fairly formalized roles 
demanded by the gift-giving ritual and at the same time re-
alize locally and personally the significance of this exchange 
in their relationship and in the encounter. Harrison details 
how the gift-giver attempts “strongly normative co-regulated 
acts” which are rejected by the would-be receiver’s sustained 
and non-cooperative “whole-bodied postures” and by her use 
of the vertical palm gesture, frequently associated with nega-
tion, as Harrison has shown elsewhere (Harrison, 2018). The 
would-be receiver meets the gift-refusal requirement with “a 
manifest lack of sensorimotor openness to the environment 
and overall unwillingness to ‘let be’”. Rather than go with the 
flow that her friend has unmistakably initiated, the receiver 
“withholds mutual gaze, directs talk to the cameraman [rath-
er than the friend/rejecting or keeping at bay the interact ion 
the gift-giving friend initiates], and uses her hands to gesture 
(rather than accept the gift)” (Harrison, forthcoming). 
In one segment of multi-modal transcript analysis in 
which there is much overlapping talk, Harrison notes that the 
giver’s vertical palm gesture transitions into a swat and then 
a full push at the protesting friend’s gesturing hands. This in-
vites Harrison to contrast a cognitive linguistic analysis of the 
conceptual negation embodied in the vertical palm gesture, 
through which the gesturer performs “as if ” an act ion was 
about to be done, with an enact ive linguistic bodies frame-
work of becoming. He writes, “The sp eaker’s subsequent 
pushing, slapping, and gripping her addressee would support 
this more environmentally embedded and intercorporeal 
view, unless we want to charact erize the Vertical Palm as fun-
damentally different to the sequence of regulatory behaviors 
within which it is embedded” (Harrison, forthcoming). This 
dynamic becoming — hands that could receive instead ex-
press, and in expressing-rather-than-receiving, they reject; 
hands lifted in expressive protest physically stop a coming 
act ion — pictures precisely the shifting, transitory individ-
uation of meaningful co-authored movement events, which 
arise out of and dissipate back into co-generated tension in 
participatory sense-making. 
Because of this dialectic between acts and agents, 
Carvalho is not quite correct when he insists that shared 
know-how makes coregulation possible. Coregulation may 
also happen spontaneously, fortuitously, etc. and in such cas-
es, we can even expect that coregulation contributes to the 
5 In his analysis of this episode Harrison draws on Yang’s work in Gifts, favours, and banquets: The art of social relationships in China 
(1994). It is interesting to note that wedding gifts, New Year’s gifts, courtesy visit gifts, and funeral gifts are guided by “renqing princi-
ples” (rather than guanxi principles of professional network building), with renqing translated as “human feelings” (Yang, 1994).
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building of shared know-hows. It is a sedimentation/spon-
taneity dialectic, in this case clearly describable in terms, for 
instance, of equilibration.
Concerning responsiveness to others being shaped by 
interact ions and this being a circular argument, the problem 
lies in conceiving complex capabilities such as responsiveness 
as atomic, either-or, skills. There is evidence of newborn and 
even in utero social responsiveness, but this does not entirely 
imply a nativist claim that we are born with responsiveness 
unshaped by social interact ion. Newborns are more respon-
sive to the rhythms of their mother’s language than to other 
languages, so even in this early form of responsiveness there 
is evidence of social shaping. One should not fear circulari-
ties provided they are spread over time and the concepts we 
are tracking are complex, varying in intensity and quality, and 
always in development. It is in this sense that it is reasonable 
to assume a non-reductive position in explaining responsive-
ness to others, social sensitivity, and social know-how.6 This 
stance is both explanatorily more accurate and receptive to 
empirical work and new empirical questions, and it doesn’t 
fall into the contradictions of reductionism, which by design 
must find some ur-capabilities or basic powers just given and 
unexplained, otherwise it has no ground upon which to re-
duce complex ideas. Reductionism is ultimately (if forgetful-
ly) mysterian.
Having said this, is it the case that the enact ive account 
does not believe in anything that isn’t shaped by interact ions? 
No, it doesn’t have to mean this. But the question is more a 
question of principle as well as a question of method. To what 
extent does any social capability originate in non-social skills? 
Empirically, it is clear that many such skills do contribute to 
social know-how and are subsequently shaped accordingly 
(say visual perception). But, insofar as this shaping becomes 
constitutive and not merely an accommodation to social 
pract ice (as it happens, at least in some cases), it is concep-
tually inaccurate to insist that the ability remains non-social. 
If visual perception is shaped socially as evidence shows (see 
Di Paolo, 2016 for a discussion of this evidence), just calling it 
visual perception tout court is in fact a misnomer (if not one 
we worry about in everyday contexts). To visually appreciate 
a painting, read a text, figure out who’s winning at the horse 
races, and so on, are all different skills (in this case all socially 
shaped and one can argue in each case whether or not they 
are socially constituted as well). Even individual sensorim-
otor skills such as reaching for an object develop in infancy 
via very different idiosyncratic paths by the confluence and 
coordination of other more basic skills (Thelen et al., 1996). 
This composition is often socially achieved, but that’s not the 
point. The point is that something new emerges in develop-
ment and it makes little sense to say, e.g., that reaching for 
an object is not more than hand grasping that happens to be 
modulated by directionally accurate arm extension. Rather, 
it is a novel skill and takes on a developmental path as such a 
novel skill. So, we claim, with social responsiveness (even if it 
is constituted also by individual capabilities). 
Ultimately, it is a moot point whether at some given stage 
there exists something we may call a minimal responsiveness 
to others, if as soon as the first response occurs this skill be-
gins a course of social shaping, differentiation, and develop-
ment, something that is already occurring in utero (Martínez 
Quintero and De Jaegher, 2020). But more strongly, the idea is 
dubious from an enact ive persp ective since the very notion of 
an individual agent, (for instance, a sensorimotor agent) relies 
on conditions that must obtain in a network of sensorimotor 
repertoires and these conditions themselves develop socially 
(as illustrated in Di Paolo et al., 2017). Attributing anything, 
a skill, an act, to an individual cannot be, in the human case, 
in opposition to its social origins and constitution. This is, a 
fortiori, true in the case of linguistic bodies.
These considerations do not obliterate other relevant 
questions, such as whether responsibility can be attributed to 
individuals for certain occurrences in social interact ion. We 
think that there are clear cases where this can be done, and oth-
ers where it is less clear. The tools and methods for resolving 
these issues can be complex and open to disputation. But we do 
not deny the question itself as a genuine question. Addressing 
this would require a careful discussion of what it means to at-
tribute responsibility (itself a socio-linguistic act embedded in 
the norms of a concrete community); i.e., we should not simply 
assume that the question is exempt from theoretical criticism 
and elaboration before rushing to answer it. 
As we said, this project is not exhausted by a single book. 
We are grateful for the gift of this space in which to clarify the 
enact ive starting point and method, which are themselves al-
ways becoming and being developed through linguistic bodies 
(the book readers, ourselves, and other researchers). The key 
to this method is holding tensions, rather than trying to evade 
them. Put another way, our deepest methodological commit-
ment takes the form of an invitation to participate. This in-
vitation reflexively obliges us to work with others, listen to 
others, and remain open to being led and changed by others 
in the service of ever more inclusive and expansive participa-
tion. After all, how can any of us truly participate if we are 
not prepared and able to—at least minimally—hold tension?
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